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ABSTRACT
We have constructed asimple two—sector model of the demand forhousing and corporate capital. A increasein the inflation rate, with andwith- out an increase in the risk
premium on equities, was then simulated with a number of model variants. Themodel and simulation experimentsillustrate both the tax bias in favor ofhousing (its initial average realuser cost was 3 percentage points less thanthat for corporate capital) and themanner in which inflation
magnifies it (the difference rises to 5percentage points without an exogenous increase inreal house prices and 4percentage points with an exogenous increase).The existence of a capita1marketconstraint offsets the increase in the bias
against corporate capital, but it introduces a sharp, inefficient reallocationof housing from less wealthy,constrained households to wealthy householdswho do not have gains onmortgages and are not financially constrained.
Widespread usage of innovative housing finance instruments wouldovercome this reallocation but at theexpense of corporate capital. (ly a reduction ininflation or in the taxation of income from businesscapital will solve the problem ofinefficient allocation of capital.
The simulation resultsare also able to provide an explanationfor the failure of nominal interestrates to rise by a multiple ofan increase in the inflation rate ina world with taxes. When the inflationrate alone was increased, the ratioof the increases in the risk—freeand in- flation rates was 1.32. Aincrease in the risk premiumon equities, in conjunction with the increase ininflation, lowered the simulated ratio
to 1.10, introduction ofa supply price elasticity of 4 andan exogenous increase in the real houseprice reduced the ratio to 1.03, andincorporation of the credit—market
constraint reduced the ratio to 0,95.
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During the past decade, the United States has been plagued bya declining
rateof productivity growth. Many have attributed this phenomenon to a
sharpslowdownin the growthofthe capital/output ratio in the industrial
sector, and others have advanced a wide variety of policies, under the
broad umbrella of reindustrialization, to increase business investment
and reverse the downward trend in productivity. Some policies are intended
to promote savings and thus total capital formation. Others are designed
to shift the composition of capital formation from residential to nonresidential.
A primary rationale for the shift policies is the argument that the United
States has overinvested in residential capital in the 1970s. More specifically,
many have contended 'that the current tax system is biased in favor of
residential capital and that this bias has been reinforced by the acceleration
of inflation during the past decade and a half.1 The bias takes the form of
declining real user costs or investment hurdle rates for housing vis-a-vis
business investment and results in households occupying housing units of
too great quantity or quality.
In spite of this apparent bias, the composition of investment in the
United states does not seem to have been altered significantly in favor
of residential uses. In fact, the reverse appears to have occurred (see
Grebier, 1979 and Feldstein, 1981). One explanation for this result is
that factors other than the tax bias may have been operating to raise
the share of nonresidential investment in total capital formation. Under
this interpretation, the tax-inflation bias has simply acted to offset such
factors. For example, if the income elasticity of the demand for housing is
less than unity, then we would expect the share of housing in GNPtodecline
Diamond (1980) and Villani (1981) have documented the decline in the real
user cost of owner-occupied housing; Hendershott and Hu (1980 and 1981b) have
emphasized the decline relative to real user costs for nonresidential capital.2
over time as real income grows. An alternative
explanation is that the model
underlying the derivation of the tax-inflation bias
is misspecified. Two
potentialproblems come to mind. First, the existenceof fixed-rate
mortgages and the capital gains earned on themduring periods of rising
interest rates might preventoptimizing households from changing (increasing)
their effective housing demandeven in the face of increasing taxadvantages.
Second, capital-market constraints (lender'srestrictions on debt payment-
income ratios) might significantlyreduce the demand for housing by less
wealthy households that move (in order to achievereal income gains)
during periods of rising inflation and interestrates. Of course, if the
effective demand for housing has not
increased, then capital cannot have
been reallocated away from industrialuses. A major goal of the present
paper is to determine the extent to which theexistence of capital gains
on existing mortgages and capital-marketconstraints could have offset
the effect of the inflation-induced
relative decline in the real user
cost of housing on the allocation ofcapital.
Withthis goal in mind, we have constructeda simple two-sector
general-equi1jbj simulation model of the demandfor housing and
corporate (nonhousing) capital.2 The modelincorporates the existing
taxstructure, introduces portfolio balance relationsfor households,
specifies risk premiums required to holdrisky assets, and includes
a federal budget constraint wherebygovernment spending moves with federal
4or theoreticalanalyses of the allocation of capitalbetween residential and nonresidential uses, see Ballentine(1981), EbrIll and Possen (1980), and Kau and Kennan (1981). Fora large scale general equilibrjsimu- lation model incorporating financialbehavior, see Slemrod (1981).3
tax revenues. To allow for the operation of credit market constraints,
households are partitioned into the wealthy who lend to the less wealthy.
(Both groups of households finance business.) The model simultaneously
determines the risk-free debt rate, risk premiums on mortgages, corporate
equities and housing, and the allocation of a fixed capital stock among
corporate capital, housing of the wealthy and housing of the less wealthy.
The model is parameterized so as to make it roughly comparable to the
Americaneconomy inthe middle 1960s.
Sections111-V contain the results of a variety of simulation
experiments. The basicexperiment is an increase in the inflation rate
from one to 8percent,either alone or accompanied by an increase in the
riskpremium on corporate equities. The experiments are run with and
without allowance for behavior influenced by capital gains on existing
mortgages. Section IV introduces an endogenously-determined real housing
price and a mechanism for incorporating an exogenous increase in the real
housing price. The impact of a capital !narket constraint on housing demand
of the less wealthy is developed in Section V. A summary concludes
the paper.I. The Model
Consider an economy in which thereare two goods -housingand
nonhousing. Housing services are producedby using only residential
capital, and the nonhousing good is producedby nonresidential capital
arid labor via a Cobb-Douglasproduction function
(1) r =
whereY is the level of nonhousjioutput; L Is the labor force; and K is
the quantity of nonresidentialcapital employed which is determinedby




where iisthe corporate Income taxrate, and Ck is the user cost of
nonresidential capital.
Assume that each unit of housingcapital produces one unit of housing
services.3 Thequantity of housing services demanded by eachhousehold i
is assumed to be. unitai'yelastic withrespect to the incomeof the
householdandelastic with respect to the implicitrents per unit of
housingand thereby the user cost ofhousing capital. Assuming that there
aren households with identical tastes inthe economy, the individual
housing demand equation is
3Wemakethesimplifying assumption that no labor isemployedin the productionof housing services. Similarly,we assume that no capital isemployed in the production ofgovernment services.5
(3) H'hD(h)
where H1 denotes the demand for housing services by the ith household;
its disposable income; and c the real user cost per unit of housing
stock. As discussed below, c Is household specific because of differences
in income (and thus personal tax rates) and wealth (and thus portfolio
compositions and risk premiums).
The total demand for housing is equal to Assuming that there is
perfect mobility of capital between residential and nonresidential uses,
we can write
(1.)W=K+H
where K is the total demand for nonresidential capital as determined in
equation (2), and is the real stock of wealth of the economy and will
be treated as a constant in the basic model. The total value of wealth,
on the other hand, is equal to
(5) W =K+PEH
where p is the real price of housing (the ratio of the price of housing
to the price ofnonhousinggoods, thelatterbeing treated as the numeraire)
andis initially unity so W = Whileall housing is assumed to be
owned directly by households, K is assumed to be held by corporations which
finance their investment byissuing bondsand equity (either directly or
byretaining earnings).6
PortfolioBalanceand Risk emjums
Householdassets includecorporatedebt, corporate equity, and housing.
Some wealthy households also hold
mortgages issued by less wealthy homeowners.
The balance sheet for eachhousehold I can be expressedby the following
equation
(6)
whereB1, E1, M1 and H'are, respectively, the amouiitz ofcorporate debt,
corporate equity, mortgage debt, andhousing owned by the ith household,
while WI and N1 are the networtharid themortgage debt incurred by it.
For simplicity, the bondsare assumed to be risk-free (thereturn is
certain). it seems reasonable toassume thatmortgagesuppliers are
never holders of mortgages or
corporate bonds. Thus for those households
with positive B1 andM1, Mis equal to zero (theirhousing purchases
are complete].y equity financed).On the other hand, for thosehaving
positive loan to value ratios, B1and N1 are equal to zero.
With respect to the riskyassets, the quantity- of each demanded
by household I relative to itstotal wealth is assumed toequal the ratio
the difference between therate of return on that assetand the risk-free
rateto the product of the riskaversion parameter and theexpected
variance of the return on thatasset:
1 1 1 I.r -i
a '1 or
W j
SeeFriend and Bluine (1975) and Slenirod(1981). All covarlances are assumed to be zero.7
(7?)
where i is the after-tax nominal return onthe risk-free asset, is
a
j
the jth risky asset, ra is its after-tax
expected nominal return and
the expected standard deviation of this return, Ris the coon risk-
aversion parameter and =
RcY(I/W
)isthe risk premium required on the
jth asset. Obviously the rates of returnand standard deviations are
after-tax and thus are household specific. Bond holdingsand mortgage





Corporationsfinance their capital by issuing bonds B and equity E.
Assumingthat average q is unity (B+E=K)and that b istheportion of





Itis heuristic to consider the case where there are onl,ytwo types
of households, the wealthy and the nonwealthy. Forthe wealthy, (6)
reducesto
=B+ EW+pHW + M.
5
Corporate financial behavior is treated as exogenous. Extrapolation from
Slenwod's simulation experiments suggests that this will not significantly
influence the results.8
The correspondingbalance sheet for thenonwealthy is
=EIt+- M
Assuming further that these
households are taxed atthe same rate, they
are faced with the same
corporate equity and bond
(risk-free) rates, and,equatjo
(7)Impliesthattheratio of E to W is thesame forall1. Consequent
(10)
wWw' W W
Thus EW =w(l-b)K,where w WW/q is theshare of total wealthheld
by the wealthy household.Note also that M
M5. Letting v be the
loan-to_value ratio on
housing investment by the
flOnw-ealthy households,
this relationshipcan befurther reduced to M=VpHN.Thus we have
(1].) WbK ÷ w(1-b)K +pHW+vpHN
and
(12)
The Real User CostsofCapital
We are now ready todetail the user costs
of capital. Taking into
acco1t the deductibjljt1 ofnominal interestcost, differences between
taxand economic





where is the expected rate of change in the price of corporate capital,
is the true depreciation rate of capital, is the depreciation
rate allowed by tax law and is the rate of property tax applied to
corporate capital.6 The nominal equity rate paid by corporations is rk
and differs from the after-tax equity rate received by shareholders,
rk8, by the taxes (atthe personal level) on dividend income and on
increases in share values resulting from retention of corporate earnings
and inflation. Letting v be the portion of real earnings (including
real gains at the expense of debtors) paid out, 8 be the common personal
income tax rate and the capital gains tax rate, the relationship






withx = +(l_v)k.Usingequations(iii.), (7'),thedefinition of p,
and (lO),we have
y(9- ) RaK
ic r =—j- ¶ +— kl-xLx k l-x W
Finally,the tax saving per unit of capital from depreciationcan be
expressedas
(16) .r6*= +t1 -tTT
6SeeHendershott(1981) and Hendershott and Hu (1981a) for a more detailed
discussionof the calculation ofusercosts for corporate capital.10
where > 0 reflects short tax lives andthe availability of accelerated
depreciation methods (with zero inflation, taxdepreciation exceeds economic
depreciation) and t2 >0acknowledges the use of historic, rather than
replacement, cost, Substituting (15) and (16) in(13) yields








Under current tax law, homeowners are notrequired to pay tax on
either the real imputed rents ornominj. capital gains earned from their
houses nor are they allowed to deductany depreciation in computing
tax liabilities. Thus the realuser cost of capital for wealthy households
withno debt financing (v=O) is given by
(17) c P[r +
8h
+(l-G)r,
where the symbols are as defined aboveexcept that they nowapplyto
housing. From equation (7'),rh is the after-tax debt rate plus a risk
premiumequalto RaHpH"/W".II
The user cost for less wealthy households is
(18) c =pLvr ÷ (1_v)rh
-+ oh+
whererm is the after-tax (risky) mortgagerate. The relationship between







Belowa critical level of the loan-to-value ratio v ,therisk associated 0
wlthhousinginvestmentis completely borne by the homeowners, and. thus
the mortgage rate they pay is equal to the risk-free rate. If the loan-
to-value ratio exceeds this value, a part of the risk is shared by lenders,
and consequently a risk premium has to be paid to them.7
Substitution of the expressions for rh and r into equations (17)
and. (18), where rh for the noriwealthy depends on their housing as a
fraction of their wealth, yields
7Because them0h term in the expression for rmis the risk premium
required by the lenders, the appropriate personal income tax rate is the
rate that applies to the average lender. This is in contrast to equation
(18) where 9 is the tax rate paid by the homeowner. In our model all
taxpayers pay the same tax rate so this distinction is irrelevant.12
(17')chli2.11h+B3]





Taxes, Government Spending, and Dispoableinccme
Government spending is assumed to equal taxes paid by households
(TXh) and corporations (TXk). Taxes of corporations are the sum of income
and property taxes or
(20) TXk= - (8*+bi÷ +
whichallows for the deductibility of (tax) depreciation, interest, and









Thefirst term in brackets is the sumoflabor, dividend, and net
interest income.
8Net interest income iscorporate interest paid under the assumption that
there is no government debt. There is no need to differentiate between
household interest paid and received because all households are assumed
to be in the same tax bracket.13
Retained earnings is the difference between corporate earnings after
taxes(EAT) and dividends which under ourearlierassumption equal
v(EAT+ bTTkK):
(22) = (i_v)[kY- + b4Jc-
TXKJ-vbkK.
Finally,household disposable income is the sumofall factor payments
received less taxes paid and the erosion of the real value of holdings of
corporatedebt:
(23) D =Y- - TX.k-RE-
IXh
-kb14
II. Model Summary and Parameterjzatjon
The basic model with housing and nonhousingcapital perfectly











+- v(1-P)J() - +
(19) =m1(v-v)+m2(v-v)2 V.>v0,otherwise =0
(2O lAKTkY - + t1-(i_)J+¶bI-t2k)K










The sectoral wealth variables have been replaced by and (lW)Wr
respectively, where w is exogenous because pis fixed. The last two
equations, where y is the portion of incomeaccruing to the wealthy and
is exogenous, are applications of equation (3).The basic model determines
W N
income (Y), the three capital quantIties (K, Hand H ),householdand
business taxes (TXh and TX,), retained earnings(RE), disposable income (D),
the risk-free rate (1), the housing loan-to-valueratio (v), and the
mortgage-rate risk premium
In view of our interest in explaining theallocation implications
of high inflation over the past decade, a naturalstarting point is to
set the initial values of the system roughly attheir actual values in
themiddle 1960s. In particular, let the initial inflationrate be one
percent andtheinitial risk-free financing rate be 3percent.Moreover,
expectedinflation rates f or corporate and housing capital areassumed to
be equal.
By the assumption that nonhousing productionis subject to constant
returns to scale and the income elasticityof housing demand is unity,
the absolute values of K, H, and L do not matter. Onlytheir relative
values are needed. Thus we arbitrarily set theinitial real wealth equal
to 1,000. We also set initial p equal to unity,K and H equal to 500
and Y =525.All these can be interpreted as billions of 1965dollars.
The ratio of K to H (i.e., 500/500 =1)is roughly the ratio of residential
to nonresidential capital in the middle 1960s (seeHendershott and Hu,
1980,Table-8), and the ratio of Y to K approximates theratio of
GNP to nonresidential capital.16
Elsewhere (1981b) we have discussed the implications ofinflation
for resource allocation when there are heterogeneous incomegroups in
different tax brackets. To isolate the wealth effect fromthe income
effect on housing demand, we assume here that all householdsearn the
same income and pay the sametaxrate. They differ from each other only
by the initial wealth they possess. In most of theanalysis, one-half
of the households are taken to be wealthy and the otherhalf less wealthy
in the sense described below.
The various tax, depreciation and financingparameters are as follows.
Tax rates: 70.52,e 0.3, u, 0.O!., 'r =0.012,r =0.016.
Economic and tax depreciation rates:
8k0.10, 8h =0.025,t1 0.01
and t2 =0.2.Payout and financing rates: Y =0.,b =1/3,and v 0.8.
With slightly over half of the housingdebt-free, the average loan-to-value
ratio for all housing is just under Q.i, the actualratio for the United
States. Discussions regarding the other parametersare contained in
Hendershott and Hu (1980)andHendershott (1981).
There are four risk parameters in the model: and m2, along with
v, determine a, and RaE and RaE, along with portfolio shares, determine
and h We set =-0.08and m2 =1.0.These values result in
a pattern of differences in mortgage rates with differentloan-to-value
ratios that approximates the observed differencesin mortgage commitment
rates for level-payment, fixed-rate mortgages withy'sof 0.5, 0.75,
0.6, 0.9 and 0.95. ForE' we use 0.12. This is consistent with a
risk-aversion parameter of 3 and an after-taxexpected variance of 0.04.
The housing variance,aH, is set at 0.005. Given the above parameter17
values, the coefficients in the corporate user cost equation (13') are
= 2 =0.51921, =0.881and =0.04376.Furthermore,
ck =0.0908,andthe coefficients in the housing user cost equations are
= —0.015and E3 =0.0376.
The elasticity of the demand for housing with respect to the rental
price or real user cost is assumed to be -0.5. Polinsky and Eliwood (1979)
report an elasticity of -0.7, while Hanushek and Quigley (1980) estimate
it to be _0.14. Rosen's (1979) mean price elasticity was -0.97, but
the estimate was of a translog function where the elasticity declined
in absolute value as the real user costfell.9 Moreover, his data were
for 1970, when the housing real user cost had not yet been fully reduced
by inflation.
Capital's share of income, 0'k' is set equal to 0.2. From this and
the other specified parameters, TX,, RE, TXh, and D can be solved
recursively as TXk =214.5,RE =114.16,TXh =137.98and D =296.71.
The quantity of labor and are then determined by simultaneous solution
of equations (1) and (2). These values are L =605.72and =0.90063.
Lastly, simultaneous solution of equations (14'), (11), (17'), (18'),
(3W) and (3N) then yields the remaining parameter values: =0.141106,
w =0.927114,c =0.05626,c =0.06306,HW =257.13and RN214.2.87.
9To illustrate, assume the functional form Ln.H = LnD+lLnch
÷
The elasticity with respect to the user cost is then Ech =+ 22log ch.
Assume that the elasticity is -1 at the initial user cost, 0.051414, and set
=-5.72(see Rosen, 1979, Table 2, p. 16). Then2 =-0.8106.The
elasticity at a percentage point lower user cost, O.0144i., is -0.67, and
at 0.031414 the elasticity is only -0.26.18
The initial balance sheets of the three sectorsare listed in Table 1.
Wealthy households have a well-balanced asset portfolio withbetween 18
and 33 percent (number In parentheses) in eachof the four assets: bonds,
equities, mortgages and housing. In constrast, thehousing of the less



































































































































































































































































































































































































III. The Impact of Increased Inflation: Fixed Prices
Table 2 presents some simulations of the model withthe relative price
of housing and the total capital stock heldconstant. The first column
contains the initial values of the key variables.Column 2 indicates how
these variables are changed by a 7percentagepoint increase in the expected
inflation rate from one to 8percent.The risk-free rate rises by nearly
9percentagepoints and the loan-to-value ratio increasesslightly.
Owingtothe heavier taxation of returns oncorporate equities than on
housing, the user cost for corporate capital rises relativeto that for
housing; the constraint that the capital stock is fixed dictatesboth
the magnitude of the rise in the risk-freerate and the movement of the
user costs in opposite directions. As a result, thecapital stock is
tilted toward housing. The increase inhousing (and decrease in corporate
capital) is a modest 3percentof the original stock.
Column 3inTable 2 supplements the increase in inflation witha
75 percent increase in the risk premium oncorporate equities (149 percent --
from14to6 percent--afterallowingfor the endogenous corporate
capitalresponse).Malkiel (1979) is the strongest proponent of the view
that the risk premium has risen)0 Because theincrease may be due to
the greater variability in prices associated withthe higher inflation
rate (Malkiel, p. 297), the joint simulation of bothincreases seems
particularlyappropriate. Addition of the increase inthe risk premium
roughlytriples the impact ofthe increase in inflation on theuser cost



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of corporate capital and on the allocation of capital. Now theincrease
in housing (and decline in corporate capital) is 12percent of the
existing stock.
Of course, many less wealthy households did not move between the
middle 1960s and late 1970s and thus did not have to refinanceat the
higher mortgage rate. In fact, capital gains on existing low rate
mortgages are a strong incentive not to refinance.11 The last simulation
reported in Table 2 takes this fact into account. In this simulation,
n proportion of the less wealthy households are assumed to have maintained
their existing financing and housing. The only modelchanges made are the
substitution of
N N€ N (3N') H =(1_n)cr(i_y)D(c)+I
forequation (3N) and the replacement of the last term in equation (ii),
\rpHN, with vp(HN -nH)+
v0p0nHN.l2We set n =0.5.
The results of this simulation are listed in column 14 of Table 2.
Because half of the less wealthy households do not alter theirhousing
and financing, the risk-free rate and loan-to-value ratio riseless. Because
all user costs are lower, the corporate capital stock andthe housing of the
wealthy and the less wealthy who move are all greater than in thecase
where all households refinance. The datum in theTable for the housing
of the less wealthy in column (14) declines relative to column(3) because
of the households that do not move but simply maintain theirexisting
11These gains declinein real terms over time as amortization occurs and
inflation takes its toll. Thus this incentiveeventually erodes.
second order wealth effect, the decline in the market value of "old"
mortgages, has not been accounted for in this simulation.23
housing. The impact of the noninovers is as much on the allocation of
housing among households as on the allocation between residential and
nonresidential capital.
The data at the bottom of Table 2 indicate that the increase in
inflation has a number of impacts on income flows. First, total income/output
declines owing to the fall in corporate capital; the drop in net income
is less, however, because of the fall in depreciation on corporate capital.
Second, household taxes (and thus government spending) rise owing to the
taxation of nominal interest and nominal increases in share prices at the
personal level. Whether corporate taxes rise or fall depends on the rise
in the risk-free rate. With the more plausible smaller increase in the
rate Lcoiumns (3) and (l)j, the increase in tax saving on interest is
more than offset by the reduction in the tax saving on depreciation so
taxes rise by 10 percent. Third, retained earnings fall sharply owing
to the rise in interest expense and the paying out of a portion of the
real gains at the expense of debtors. Fourth, disposable income tends
to decline by about the sum of the fall in net income and the rise in
taxes. To illustrate, consider column (3). Total income falls by $13
billion, but the decline in net income is only $7 billion because depreciation
drops by $6 billion. Taxes rise by $14 billion and disposable income is
reduced by $11 billion.214.
IV. Variable Housing Prices
In the above simulations the real price ofhousing was held constant.
Capital was assumed to be perfectly mobile betweenhousing and. nonhousing
uses, and relative real user costs allocated the capital. Infact, the
real price of housing --theratio of the price of a constant quality
house to the CpI net of shelter --roseby 40 percent between 1965 and
1979. Inthe following simulations, a finitesupply price elasticity
isincorporated into the model, and a shift parameter isintroducedinto
thehousing supply function. Housing capital is stillassumed to be
perfectly tradable between wealthy and nonwealthy households.







2 p H I r 2 o
where H is the initial stock of housing. Thebracketed term on the
right-hand side of (4"),i.e.,
W N 1_____ s(
H
(H +H ,H)=—-- + i\ w o H+i
is the mobility factor. This factorequals 1 if there is perfect mobility
of capital between residential andnonresidential uses and equals H0/(H'÷HN)25
ifcapital is not mobile between the two uses. The former case holds
when s =0,and equation (1.") reduces to (L) when 2 =1.The
latter case holds when s =and implies that W =K+Hfor =X 1.
r o 12
As can be seen from equation (2), the coefficient s turns out to be the
inverse of the supply elasticity of housing. and 2 are introduced
in (ii.") to allow for productivity change in the nonhousing and housing
sectors, respectively, and they are equal to unity in the absence of
technical progress. Technical progress in the nonhousing industries can
be considered as an exogenous increase in in equation (1). However,
because of' the assumption of a Cobb4)ouglas production function, it can
be expressed in terms of the "capital aunenting!v rate and translated into
an increase in )] X2 is likewise introduced, As can be seen from (2k),
the ratio l'2 turns out to be the exogenous shift factor in the suppiy
function of housing. There is some empirical evidence that the efficiency
increase in nonhousing industries exceeded that in the construction
industry between 1965 and 1978 (Hendershott, 1980, Table 6). As a result,
there has been an exogenous increase in real construction costs (Grebler,
1979, Exhibit 17). In some experiments, we will raise to 1.15 and
lower to 0.88162, thereby abstracting from growth considerations;
thus the exogenous increase in p will be from 1.0 to 1.3, or 30 percent.13
The second major change follows from the fact that the endogenization
of p requires the endogenization of the wealth variables: W,W and wN.
Three equations are added:
13Therelative changes in l andare calibrated such thattheaverage
of the reciprocals of their levels is unity. Thus the changes leave





andequation (ii) is replaced by:
(ii') W =bK+w(l-b)K÷ pH +
Equations(11'), (5') and (12) determine the new wealth values based
upon the initial housing holdings, and equation (25) imposes the sectoral
balance sheet constraint based upon simulated values.
The first column of Table 3 lists the impacts of the increase inthe
inflation rate and equity risk premium on the keyendogenous variables
for the case of a fixed real housing price or an infinitesupply price
elasticity. The results are the same as those in column 3 of Table 2.
The second and third columns here report results forsupply price elasticities
of 14 and 0.01 (values of s of 0.25 and 100, respectively))With an
elasticity of 14, the real housing price rises by 2* percent (the increase
is 6 percent for an elasticity of 2). Because this tendsto raise the
real user cost for housing, the increase in the risk-freerate necessary
to equilibrate the market for capital goods is notas great. The increase
in the real housing price provides both types of households withroughly
equal dollar real capital gainsbecausetheir initial housing wasroughly
recent estimates of this elasticity are 9 (Smith, 1976,p. 1401) and
2 (Poterba, 1980, p. 11). We take 14. as the mostlikely value.
Unfortunatelythe rangeof estimates is even wider than 2 to 9.27
equal. However, as a percent of initial wealth, the gain is much greater
f or the highly-levered, less-wealthy households, 9 percent versus 0.7
percent for the wealthy. The absolute values of the changes in user
costs and quantities of capital are roughly 6 percent less than when the






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Asthe supply price elasticity approaches zero, more and more of the
adjustment is achieved by a rise in the real price of housing and less by
increases in the risk-free rate. With an elasticity of 0.01, the risk-free
rate rises by only 7 percentage points and the increase in the user cost
on corporate capital is only 3 basis points. The rise in the real price
of housing is 45 percent, and less wealthy households maintain most of
this gain in housing equity, lowering the loan-to-value ratio by 18 percent-
age points. Because the real user cost for housing is higher forless
wealthy households, the increase in the real supply price of housing
raises their user cost relative to that of wealthy households, although
both decline, tending to raise the demand for housing. The small fall in
the quantity of housing demanded by the less wealthy is attributable to
the decline in disposable income. This, in turn, is due to an increase
in taxes, $2.8 billion of which is property taxes on the inflated house
values.
Column (4) is the result of a simulation with both a supply price
elasticity of 4 and an exogenous 30 percent upward shift in the supply of
housing schedule (x1 =1.15,x20.88462).
15The results are quite
similar to those of column 3 where the supply price elasticity was near
zero. Because the real price of housing rises by less, the risk-free rate
rises by more and the reallocation away from corporate capital is $20
billion or 4 percent.
One-third or 10 percent of this shift is probably better interpreted
as a result of the supply elasticity of 4. Between 1965 and 1978 the stock
of residential housing increased by about 45 percent. This is not incor-
porated into our analysis which abstracts from growth considerations. From
equation (24) and the assumption that s1/4, this increase would raise
p from 1.0 to 1.1 =(1.45)0.25.30
V. The Capital Market Constraint
Recent empirical studies suggest that nominal, as well as real,
mortgage rates affect housing demand.
16
The most straight-forward
cause of this result is the well-known housing cost/income limit that
lenders impose on borrowers. Housing costs, excludingutilities, are the
sum of outlays for maintenance, property taxes, and mortgage payments. In
terms of our earlier symbols, the ratio of nonutility housing costs(HC)
of the nonwealthy households that move to their after-tax labor income
(Y*) is:
/ 25 NN
r ri+r) p(H-nH )
(26) [h(1_)'r +
(1+r)25-i
whereY*(1y)(l_n)(l_Q)(1_rvk)Y and r is the after-tax mortgage rate on
a level-payment mortgage with a 25 year life. Using the initial values of
the variables, the ratio is 0.135. For thepurposes of the paper, we
specify the limit allowed by lenders to be 0.17.
When equation (26), after setting the left-side equal to 0.17, is
solved for v using the values of i, ,HNand Y from the simulation of
increases in inflation and the risk premium, a value of 48percent is
obtained. That is, mortgage payments and other costs rise so high rela-
tive to income that lenders (wealthy households) would be willing toex-
tend only 72 percent (48/67) of the mortgage debt desired by lesswealthy
16
Hendershort (1980) and Follain (1981) report macro and micro evidence,
respectively. See also Kearl and Mishkin (1977).31
households who move. The credit shortfall is$62 billion (0.67-0.48 times
$326 billion). In the absence of more innovative financing instruments,
such as graduated payment or shared appreciated mortgages, these house-
holds are simply unable to purchase the desired housing.
To incorporate this constraint into the analysis, we replace the
equation for the desired housing demand of less wealthy households with
equation (26) after setting the left-hand side equal to 0.17. In effect,
this equation determines the loan-to-value ratio and the quantity of
housing held is derived from the balance sheet constraint of—these house-
holds. The results from a simulation of the revised model are listed in
column 2 of Table 4; column 1 repeats column 4 of Table 3 where the capital
market constraint is not binding. The loan-to-value ratio declines by
nearly 5 percentage points relative to column 1, and the increase in the
risk-free interest rate is three-quarters of a percentage point less.
Because "rationing" of less wealthy households occurs, a smaller increase
in interest rates and in the user cost for corporate capital is needed to
equilibrate the capital market. While the user cost for nonwealthyhouse-
holds falls sharply, it is irrelevant; the capital-market constraint leads
to a decline in their housing. The net result is an unchanged stock of
corporate capital, and a significant reallocation of housingfrom the less
wealthy to the wealthy. The housing of the latter now falls by 6 percent
instead of rising slightly.
Of course, many less wealthy households will not move when faced with
high nominal mortgage rates and a binding capital market constraint.





















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































households are assumed to maintain their existing housing. Because the
housing of nonmoving, less wealthy households does not decline (the credit
market constraint is less binding in the aggregate), the increase in the
risk-free rate is greater than in column 2 and the decline is the loan-to-
value ratio is less. The net result is a small, one percent, decline in
corporate capital and offsetting rise in housing capital. There is still
a significant shift in the housing stock from the less wealthy to the
wealthy; in fact, the housing of the less-wealthy movers now falls by a
full 17½ percent [21.l/(242.9x0.5)1.
The imposition of the credit market constraint in the simulations is an
admittedly crude attempt to approximate the real world. Our method of im-
posing the constraint tends to overstate its impact on housing demand for
three reasons. First, all the impact of the constraint falls on housing; in
fact, constrained households would also be expected to hold less of other
assets, equities in our model. (Because equity holdings of the constrained
households are only 10 percent of their housing, this source of overstate-
ment is not large.) Second, if the income elasticity of housing is less
than unity and if households that move do so to earn higher real income,
then the credit market constraint is less binding than our treatment
implies. Third, the limit on the housing costs/income ratio assumed to
be imposed by lenders, 0.17, is probably too low. On the other hand, our
method tends to understate the impact in an important respect. The calcula-
tions assumed that all households owned houses in 1965 and reaped 30 percent
real capital gains since then. As a result the desired loan-to-value ratio
declined from 80 percent to 67 percent. In reality, many less wealthy
households are of a more recent vintage and have not participated in these34
real capital gains. For these householdsthe desired loan-to-value ratio
is close to 80 percent and thus the creditmarket constraint is far more
binding than that based on our analysis. On balance, we view our
results as roughly indicative of theaggregative impact of the capital
market constraint.
The simulation results reported in column3 are also consistent with
the changes observed between the middlel960s and late 1970s in many
respects other than the maintenance of thecorporate capital stock.
Three seem worthy of note. First, theratio of the increase in the risk—
free rate to the increase in the inflationrate, 0.95, is roughly that
observed. Second, the 6 percent increase inreal business taxes is close
to the observed 10 percent increase in realprofit taxes between 1965 and
1979. Third, the sharp fall in real retainedearnings (after adjustment
for inventory valuation and capitalconsumption allowances), 83 percent,
is not far from the observed 70percent decline between the same years.
VI, Conclusion
We have constructed a simple two-sectormodel of the demand for
housing and corporate capital. An increase in theinflation rate, with
and without an increase in the riskpremium on equities, was then simu-
lated with a number of model variants.The model and simulation experi-
ments illustrate both the tax bias in favor ofhousing (its initial
17
This suggests that the distributionalimpact of inflation on households
is far more complex than that impliedby our two household world. Ex-
tension of the model to allow for agreater diversity of households would be useful.35
average real user cost was 3 percentage points less than that for corporate
capital) and the manner in which inflation magnifies it (the difference
rises to 5 percentage points without an exogenous increase in real house
prices and 4 percentage points with an exogenous increase). The existence
of a capital-market constraint offsets the increase in the bias against
corporate capital, but it introduces a sharp, inefficient reallocation
of housing from less wealthy, constrained households to wealthy house-
holds who do not have gains on mortgages and are not financially con-
strained. Widespread usage of innovative housing finance instruments
would overcome this reallocation but at the expense of corporate capital.
Only a reduction in inflation or in the taxation of income from business
capital will solve the problem of inefficient allocation of capital.
Current legislative proposals to increase business depreciation allow-
ances and to reduce the corporate tax rate and the taxation of capital
gains are steps in the latter direction.
The simulation results are also able to provide an explanation for
the failure of nominal interest rates to rise by a multiple of an increase
18
in the inflation rate in a world with taxes. When the inflation rate
alone was increased, the ratio of the increases in the risk-free and in-
flation rates was 1.32. This is a weighted average of the increases necessary
to leave the real user costs of corporate (1.30) and housing (1.43) capital
constant, where the former is weighted twice as heavily as the latter be-
cause the elasticity of corporate capital with respect to the real user is
twice as large as the elasticity of housing. The necessary increases de-
pend on the taxation of corporate and housing income at both the personal
18See Feldstein and Summers (1978) and Hendershott (1981) for earlier
efforts at solving this puzzle.36
and, for the former, corporate levels. Toillustrate, the necessary
ratio for housing is simply 11(1-9). Anincrease in the risk premium on
equities, in conjunction with the increase ininflation, lowered the
simulated ratio to 1.10, introduction ofa supply price elasticity of 4
and an exogenous increase in the real houseprice reduced the ratio to
1.03, and incorporation of the credit-marketconstraint reduced the ratio
to 0.95.
The present model can usefully be extendedin a variety of directions,
one of which seems especially important.
Currently, aggregate savings is
implicitly assumed to be equal to replacement investmentof real and housing
capital. Thus the real stock of wealth of theeconomy remains constant
over time. In the real world, however,aggregate savings tends to exceed
the replacement investment ofcapital and the positive net investment en-
sures that the real stock of wealthgrows over time. Capital accumulation
and income growth would have no effecton its relative allocation between
the two uses if the income elasticity ofhousing demand were unitary and
the real user costs were constant. Infact, there appears to be a general
concensus that the income elasticity of housing issignificantly less
than unity (Hanushek and Quigley,1980, Polinsky and Eliwood, 1979, and
Rosen, 1979) and the real user costs have not beenconstant. To accomodate
these factors and to deduce the impact ofinflation on capital accumula-
tion generally, the model will be extended ina growth setting. This will
allow for changes in real after-tax interestrates and real wealth (in-
cluding the effect of increases in the realprice of housing) to impact
on saving.37
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